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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we attempt to bridge the resilience school of thought and incentive compatibility in livestock 
disease control policies through a pilot choice experiment study conducted on 104 farm households in the 
Nasarawa state of Nigeria. The aim of this study was to shed light on farm households’ valuation of 
various compensation plan attributes and trade-offs among these attributes. In the experiment presented 
here, compensation plan was defined broadly to include not just the traditional attributes, such as the 
number of days it takes to receive the payment, the compensation rate, and the method of payment, but 
also more diverse interventions, such as training in biosecurity measures and access to bank loans, which 
are expected to have longer-term impacts on households’ livelihood outcomes. We analyzed the data 
using various discrete choice models, the best-fitting of which was the random parameter (or mixed) logit 
model with interactions, which enabled us to capture both unobserved and observed heterogeneity in farm 
households’ preferences for the compensation plan attributes. The results reveal that overall, study 
households preferred compensation plans that made payment in fewer days, provided facilitated credit 
access, and offered biosecurity training. Households with better-educated heads and those with lower 
income levels valued compensation plans that provided credit access and biosecurity training the most. 
These findings are expected to inform the design of efficient, effective, equitable, and targeted 
compensation policies, which could not only reduce the livestock disease risk but also improve the 
resilience of poor farm households’ livelihoods against future poultry-related or other idiosyncratic 
shocks. 
Keywords:  choice experiment method, conditional logit model, random parameter logit model, 
livestock disease, avian flu, compensation scheme  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The important role of compensation policy for the efficient and effective control of zoonotic diseases, 
such as avian flu, is well recognized. Several studies have used theoretical or empirical approaches, or 
both, to derive the optimal level of compensation for zoonotic diseases under different scenarios (see, for 
example, Gramig, Horan, and Wolf 2005; Beach, Poulous, and Pattanayak 2006). It has been 
demonstrated that if the compensation rate is set too low, farmers have little incentive to report outbreaks, 
whereas if it is set too high, moral hazard ensues with disincentive to invest in control measures. The rate 
of compensation is therefore a very important policy tool for influencing farmer behavior (Beach, 
Poulous, and Pattanayak 2006).  
Compensation policy has the dual role of protecting farmers’ livelihoods while providing them 
with incentives for reporting outbreaks and for investing in control measures to reduce disease risk. In 
developing countries, compensation policy functions as a safety net, especially for resource-poor farm 
households (Amanfu 2006). In addition to cash-based compensation, there are other potential 
interventions that may reduce poor farm households’ vulnerability to disease outbreaks as well as to other 
livelihood shocks. The occurrence and spread of zoonotic disease outbreaks could be minimized through 
providing, for example, information, technical assistance and training in biosecurity measures, and 
financial support (Beach, Poulous, and Pattanayak 2006). Such interventions could enable farm 
households to adopt private prevention and control measures at socially optimal levels (Beach, Poulous, 
and Pattanayak 2006). Moreover, given that the great majority of livestock in developing countries is 
managed by resource-poor, small-scale, or household-level producers (Livestock in Development 1999), 
an integrated approach that combines building of livelihood resilience with the design of compensation 
policy is warranted. According to the resilience school of thought (Resilience Alliance 2007), households’ 
resilience to several covariant socioecological or idiosyncratic livelihood shocks, such as zoonotic 
diseases, could be enhanced through diversification of livelihood strategies assisted by, for example, 
training in alternative income-generating activities and increased access to credit (Holling 1973; Ellis 
1998, 2000; Adger 2000; Folke et al. 2002a, 2002b; Gunderson and Holling 2002; Eriksen, Brown, and 
Kelly 2005; Marschke and Berkes 2006).  
Several experts have highlighted lack of knowledge about the optimal rate of compensation and 
the scope of compensation policy in developing countries, pointing out the need to consult with farmers 
about what types and levels of compensation they find acceptable (Amanfu 2006; Delgado 2006). There 
is a need to estimate farmers’ demand for livelihood-enhancing interventions vis-à-vis cash-based 
compensation and to study the potential trade-offs farmers may make between cash-based compensation 
and interventions that may yield longer-term outcomes (such as training or credit). Moreover, an 
understanding of the heterogeneity in farmers’ preferences for these public interventions, each with 
different scope and cost, could help inform the design of efficient, effective, and targeted compensation 
and livelihood enhancement plans.  
In this paper we present the results of a pilot stated-preference choice experiment study that 
aimed at estimating farmers’ valuation of various compensation policy attributes and their trade-offs 
among these attributes. We define compensation policy in wide terms to include not just the traditional 
attributes such as the level of payment and the number of days it takes to receive it, but also more diverse 
interventions including training in biosecurity measures and access to bank loans for livelihood 
diversification. The study presented in this paper was conducted in Nigeria, where avian flu is considered 
to be endemic and two different compensation plans have been in place since 2006 (Obi, Oparinde, and 
Maina 2008).  
The first outbreak in Nigeria occurred in January 2006 and the most recent one occurred in July 
2008.  During this period numerous outbreaks were recorded in 25 States and the Federal Capital 
Territory, of the 36 states in Nigeria.  The outbreaks occurred in all poultry production systems, including 
the household level, backyard/village extensive ones. According to the records of the World Bank funded 
Avian Influenza Control Program, from February 2007 to January 2008 NGN623,077,880  
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(US$4,215,683) has been paid in the form of compensation to farmers whose birds were culled, however 
no information is available on the costs of culling, diagnostic testing of samples, cleaning and disinfection 
and other administrative costs. Similarly, changes in the numbers of commercial, semi-commercial and 
backyard production systems before and after the outbreaks remain un-quantified by the government 
authorities (Obi, Oparinde, and Maina 2008). 
There have been a few studies that investigated the economic impacts of these outbreaks. A study 
conducted in 16 of the 36 states, right after the initial outbreaks revealed that the official confirmation of 
avian flu caused panic, resulting in the total boycotting of poultry and poultry products (UNDP, 2006). 
Within two weeks, egg and chicken sales declined by 80 percent, due to demand shock, and up to four 
months after, prices had not recovered up to 50 percent of pre-avian flu levels. The study found that 
although the highest bird mortality rates occurred in commercial farms, village and backyard poultry 
farmers were also severely affected by the avian flu outbreaks, since they lack necessary assets for 
recovery and often did not qualify for compensation (especially village extensive poultry producing 
households). Affected backyard producers suffered up to a 100 percent poultry income loss, while non-
affected producers also witnessed poultry income losses as high as 68.2 percent (UNDP 2006; Obi, 
Oparinde, and Maina 2008).   
In addition to this study, there have been a few state level studies that investigated the economic 
impacts of HPAI on poultry producers. A study conducted in Kwara state found that avian flu resulted in 
a 57 percent drop in the chicken prices in this state (Obayelu 2007).  The household level demand shock 
was as high as 80 percent, and supply shock resulted in 75 percent of poultry farmers to stop ordering of 
new supplies of birds and to opt out of poultry farming altogether. According to Obayelu (2007) 
household level small-scale commercial producers and backyard poultry farmers suffered the most 
income losses as a result of HPAI. A more recent study conducted by UNICEF and AED in Kano and 
Lagos states found that HPAI shocks resulted in substantial losses in employment in the poultry sector, as 
well as sharp decreases in poultry prices.   In Kano, the price of chicken in the markets dropped by as 
much as 90 percent, while in Lagos the price fell by 81 percent (UNICEF/AED, 2008).  
A more recent study by Birol et al (2010) used nationally representative data and quasi-
experimental impact evaluation methods to estimate the livelihood impacts of avian flu outbreaks.   This 
study found that the average number of birds kept by a Nigerian household (around five birds) is too 
small for avian flu outbreaks to result in a significant impact on household income or wealth.  However 
those households who kept larger, i.e., above average size, flocks could lose up to 42 percent of their 
livestock income (which translates to 7.4 percent of their total annual household income) if they lost up to 
75 percent of their flocks due to avian flu outbreaks.   
For the study presented in this paper, we interviewed 104 farmers in the northern state of 
Nasarawa, where avian flu outbreaks have occurred in the small-scale, household-level poultry sector. We 
analyzed the data using a conditional logit model (CLM) as well as a mixed logit or random parameter 
logit model (RPLM) and RPLM with interactions, in order to investigate unobserved and observed 
heterogeneity in farmers’ preferences for various compensation plan attributes. The results of our analysis 
reveal that overall, farmers chose compensation plans that made the payment sooner, provided facilitated 
credit access, and offered biosecurity training. Farm households with better-educated heads and those 
with lower income levels valued compensation plans that provided credit access and biosecurity training 
more than other households did. These findings are expected to inform the design of efficient, effective, 
and targeted compensation policies that could not only reduce the avian disease risk but also improve the 
resilience of poor farmers’ livelihoods against future poultry-related or other idiosyncratic shocks. 
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. The next section describes the choice experiment method 
and the econometric models applied. Section 3 explains the choice experiment design and survey 
administration, and presents the descriptive statistics. The results of the econometric analyses are reported 
in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.  
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2.  THE CHOICE EXPERIMENT METHOD 
The choice experiment method has its theoretical grounding in Lancaster’s model of consumer choice 
(Lancaster 1966) and its econometric basis in random utility theory (RUT) (Luce 1959; McFadden 1974). 
Lancaster proposed that consumers derive satisfaction not from goods themselves but from the attributes 
they provide. To illustrate the basic model behind the choice experiment presented here, consider a 
farmer’s choice of a compensation plan. Assume that utility depends on choices made from a choice set 
C, which includes all possible alternative compensation plans. The farmer has a utility function of the 
form 
  ) ( ) ( ij ij ij Z e Z V U + = .  (1) 
For any farmer i, a given level of utility will be associated with any compensation plan alternative 
j. Utility derived from any of the compensation plan alternatives depends on the attributes of the 
compensation plan (expressed in vector Z), such as the amount of compensation per bird, the number of 
days it takes to receive the payment, and whether or not the plan includes non-monetary benefits such as 
biosecurity training or access to a loan. 
RUT is the basis for integrating behavior with economic valuation in the choice experiment 
method. According to RUT, the utility of a choice is composed of a deterministic component (V) and an 
error component (e), which is independent of the deterministic part and follows a predetermined 
distribution. The error component implies that predictions cannot be made with certainty. Choices made 
between alternatives will be a function of the probability that the utility associated with a particular 
compensation plan option j is higher than the utility associated with other alternatives. Assuming that the 
relationship between utility and attributes is linear in the parameters and variables function, and that the 
error terms are identically and independently distributed with a Weibull distribution, the probability that 
any particular compensation plan alternative j will be chosen can be expressed in terms of a logistic 
distribution. Equation (1) can be estimated with a conditional logit model (CLM) (McFadden 1974; 
Greene 1997; Maddala 1999).  
The assumptions about the distribution of error terms that are implicit in the use of the CLM 
impose a particular condition known as the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property. IIA 
states that the relative probabilities of two options being chosen are unaffected by introduction or removal 
of other alternatives. If the IIA property is violated, then CLM results will be biased. A second limitation 
of CLM is that it assumes homogeneous preferences across respondents. Preferences, however, especially 
those of farmers, are generally heterogeneous and depend on various household- and farm-level factors. 
Accounting for this heterogeneity enhances the accuracy and reliability of estimates of benefits, marginal 
welfare, and total welfare (Greene 1997). Furthermore, accounting for heterogeneity makes it possible to 
recommend policies that take equity concerns into account. An understanding of who will be affected by 
a policy change and of the aggregate economic value associated with such a change is necessary for the 
design of equitable policies (Boxall and Adamowicz 2002).  
Compared to the CLM, the random parameter logit model (RPLM) does not require the IIA 
assumption and can also account for unobserved, unconditional heterogeneity in preferences across 
farmers. The random utility function in the RPLM is given by 
  ) ( )) ( ( j i j ij Z e Z V U + + = η β
  (2)  
Similarly to the CLM, utility has a deterministic component (V) and an error component 
stochastic term (e). Indirect utility is assumed to be a function of the choice attributes (Zj), with the utility 
parameter vector 𝗽, which may vary across farmers by a random component ηi due to preference 
heterogeneity. The probability of choosing j in each of the choice sets can be derived by specifying the  
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distribution of the error terms e and η (Train 1998). By accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, the 
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.  (3)  
Since this model is not restricted by the IIA assumption, the stochastic part of utility may be 
correlated among alternatives and across the sequence of choices via the common influence of ηi. Treating 
preference parameters as random variables requires estimation by simulated maximum likelihood. 
Procedurally, the maximum likelihood algorithm searches for a solution by simulating k draws from 
distributions with given means and standard deviations. Probabilities are calculated by integrating the 
joint simulated distribution. 
Even if unobserved heterogeneity can be accounted for in the RPLM, however, this model fails to 
explain the sources of heterogeneity (Boxall and Adamowicz 2002). One solution to detecting the sources 
of heterogeneity while accounting for unobserved heterogeneity could be to include interactions of 
farmer-specific household and farm characteristics with choice-specific attributes in the utility function. 
The RPLM with interactions can detect preference variation in terms of the heterogeneity of tastes 
(unconditional or random heterogeneity) and the heterogeneity of individual characteristics (conditional 
heterogeneity), thereby improving the fit of the model (Revelt and Train 1998). When the interaction 
terms are included, the indirect utility function that is estimated becomes 
  m l n n ij S S S Z Z Z V δ δ δ β β β + + + + + + + = ... ... 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 ,  (4) 
where n is the number of compensation plan attributes considered and the vector of utility parameters β1 
to βn is attached to the vector of attributes (Z). In this specification, m is the number of farmer-specific 
household and farm characteristics that explain the choice of compensation plan, and the vector of 
coefficients δ1 to δl corresponds to the vector of interaction terms (S) that influence utility. Since farmer-
specific household and farm characteristics are constant across choice occasions for any given farmer, 
they enter as interaction terms only with the compensation plan attributes. Interaction terms help to 
capture heterogeneity across farm households, minimizing the error component ηi. 
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3.  SURVEY DESIGN AND ADMINISTRATION 
Data Collection and Sample 
In this pilot choice experiment study, time and budget constraints allowed for only a small sample size. A 
multi-stage sampling procedure was undertaken. In the first stage, of the 35 local government areas 
(LGAs) in which avian flu outbreaks had been confirmed, Kokona LGA, in the northern state of 
Nasarawa, was chosen as the study site. In 2006, Kokona recorded the first confirmed highly pathogenic 
avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak in small-scale household-level poultry in Nigeria (Obi, Oparinde, and 
Maina 2008).  
Based on review of the secondary data and consultations with local government officials in 
Kokona, a list of villages was compiled. This list included village characteristics, such as income status, 
major livelihood activities undertaken by the households (for example, crop farming, livestock 
production, and off-farm employment), infrastructure level and quality (including distance to the main 
road and distance to market centers), and avian flu status (whether or not there had been recorded 
outbreaks, and whether or not culling and consequent compensation took place).  
In the second stage of the multi-stage sampling procedure, two villages were chosen from the 
village list based on their characteristics. These villages were Hayin Gada and Angwan Mayo, which 
were similar in terms of several characteristics such as income, livelihood activity portfolio, and distance 
to markets and main road (as reported in Table 3.1) but differed in terms of avian flu outbreak status. 
Hayin Gada had experienced an HPAI outbreak, with consequent culling and compensation interventions, 
in 2006. Angwan Mayo, on the other hand, had not experienced any avian flu outbreaks, though 
livelihood outcomes of poultry farmers in this village, as in other villages in the Kokona LGA, were 
expected to be affected by the avian flu threat. These two villages, with different avian flu status, were 
chosen in order to investigate whether ex post preferences of poultry producers in Hayin Gada differ from 
ex ante ones of those in Angwan Mayo.  
In the third stage of the multi-stage sampling procedure, household lists were compiled for both 
of the villages. One-third of all households in both villages were randomly selected to be interviewed with 
the choice experiment and household survey instruments. A total of 104 households were interviewed 
face to face during the dry season (February and March) of 2009, when farmers were less busy with crop 
farming activities and could devote the time to participate in these structured survey instruments. 
Descriptive statistics of the households interviewed are reported in Table 3.1.  
According to the descriptive statistics reported in Table 3.1, key household and household head 
characteristics, livelihood diversification, and infrastructure access for the two villages were not 
statistically significantly different. Therefore it can be concluded that the two villages, which were similar 
in terms of these characteristics but different in terms of avian flu status, were selected successfully for 
the purposes of this study.  
One interesting finding is that in Hayin Gada village the percentage of households that kept 
poultry fell significantly from 96 percent before the 2006 outbreak to 75 percent when the survey data 
were collected in February 2009. In Angwan Mayo too, the percentage of households that kept poultry 
was lower in 2009 than it was in 2006, though the difference is not statistically significant. Even though 
this reduction in the percentage of households that kept poultry in Hayin Gada may not be directly 
attributable to the avian flu outbreak (since this study was not a randomized control trial, and the before 
and after data are self-reported and hence likely to be inaccurate due to various recall or strategic biases), 
this finding may be indicative of the impact of the avian flu outbreak regarding the households’ choice of 
a livelihood activity.  
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Table 3.1—Descriptive statistics of the sampled households, pooled and by village  
 
All households, 
N = 104 
Hayin Gada 
households, 
N = 30 
Angwan Mayo 
households, N = 74 
Household Characteristic  Mean (std. dev.) 
Household head age  45.29 (15.20)  49.36 (14.80)  43.89 (15.19) 
Household head education   8.85 (5.41)  9.46 (5.15)  8.65 (5.52) 
Household size  6.44 (3.19)  6.80 (3.23)  6.32 (3.18) 
Total household income (in NGN)/month  32074 (42477)  34761 (29400)  31153 (46253) 
Land area owned (in ha)  9.19 (20.22)  12.52 (29.30)  7.91 (15.49) 
Number of cattle kept/year  1.39 (7.91)  0 (0)  1.92 (9.26) 
Number of pigs kept/year  1.59 (2.91)  1.29 (2.68)  1.71 (3.00) 
Number of goats kept/year  2.55 (4.09)  2.89 (4.50)  2.41 (3.95) 
Number of sheep kept/year  0.63 (3.83)  0 (0)  0.88 (4.49) 
Number of poultry kept/year***  34.74 (59.85)  89.27 (101.99)  18.30 (22.79) 
Income from poultry sales/month  310.43 (1242.45)  619.27 (1755.46)  195.71 (979.57) 
Income from poultry sales as a share of total 
monthly income (%) 
1.08 (4.10)  1.48 (3.50)  0.93 (4.31) 
Number of birds lost to culling in 2006  7.89 (18.60)  27.30 (26.07)  NA 
Distance to market (minutes)  428.55 (392.89)  478.12 (363.10)  411.34 (403.71) 
Distance to major road (minutes)  10.10 (12.60)  7.28 (4.43)  11.07 (14.27) 
  Percentage 
Household head gender is male = 1, 0 
otherwise 
89.00  88.00  89.00 
Household has access to market = 1, 0 
otherwise  
95.00  92.00  96.00 
Household is member of poultry association = 
1, 0 otherwise 
19.00  20.00  19.00 
Household kept poultry at the time of the 
interview = 1, 0 otherwise*** 
89.00  75.00  95.00 
Household kept poultry before 2006 outbreak 
= 1, 0 otherwise 
98.00  96.00  99.00 
Household lost birds to culling = 1, 0 
otherwise 
19.00  68.00  NA 
Of those whose birds were culled, household 
was compensated = 1, 0 otherwise 
71.43  71.43  NA 
Household aware of culling as avian flu 
control strategy = 1, 0 otherwise 
98.00  99.00  97.00 
Household aware of compensation plan for 
birds culled = 1, 0 otherwise 
92.00  93.00  92.00 
Source: Nasarawa Avian Flu Compensation Choice Experiment Survey, 2009. 
Notes: NGN, Nigerian naira, US$1 = NGN 151.5 (exchange rate on October 28, 2010); ***significantly different across the two 
villages according to the pairwise t-test and Pearson chi-square test, respectively; NA, not applicable since there were not any 
HPAI outbreaks in Angwan Mayo village. 
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Finally, it is also worth noting that the average flock size kept by the Hayin Gada households was 
significantly larger than that in Angwan Mayo. However, neither the monthly income from poultry sales 
nor the share of monthly income obtained from poultry sales was significantly different across the two 
villages. Therefore we cannot argue that the role of poultry in income was different across the two 
villages, although poultry may have provided a larger share of other livelihood outcomes (for example, 
food and nutrition security) for Hayin Gada households than it did for Angwan Mayo households.  
Design of Choice Sets 
As mentioned in the introduction, in the choice experiment study presented here we endeavored to define 
a broad compensation policy, which included not only short-term benefits such as monetary compensation 
for the birds culled but also other public interventions that may have longer-term impacts on households’ 
livelihood outcomes. These impacts would be expected to materialize through diversification of 
households’ livelihood portfolios so as to improve their resilience to future shocks, whether caused by 
avian flu, other poultry diseases, or other idiosyncratic shocks.  
In each of the selected villages, three focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted to identify 
the relevant attributes and their levels to be used in the choice experiment. In order to avoid several 
problems that may potentially arise in FGD settings (such as domineering personalities, gender 
differences, and some participants’ unwillingness to contradict older individuals or those with higher 
standing in the community) each focus group was kept small (seven participants) and men, women, and 
younger participants were grouped separately. (Please see Oparinde 2011 for a detailed explanation of the 
focus group methodology and findings). 
In Hayin Gada village, where avian flu outbreaks and consequent culling and compensation 
programs took place in 2006, the focus group participants were asked their experiences and opinions 
about the compensation plan of 2006, and what aspects of the plan they would like to see changed. In 
Angwan Mayo village, on the other hand, focus group participants were asked about what kind of 
compensation plan they would prefer if their birds were to be culled in the future.  
FGD participants in Hayin Gada stated that the compensation rates they were offered in 2006 
were too low compared to the local market prices of poultry at the time. Many of the participants in this 
village stated that it took them up to five months to receive payments after their birds were culled. In both 
villages the FGD participants said they would like to receive the compensation payment as soon as 
possible. Moreover, none of the FGD participants in either village were aware of the new compensation 
plan that was introduced in 2007.  
When asked about the means through which the payments were to be made, participants in four 
of the six focus groups said they would prefer to be paid privately, either in the bank or in their own 
homes, whereas two groups preferred the current public disbursement of payments.  
Finally, focus group members were also asked if there were other services or benefits they would 
expect from the authorities in addition to or instead of monetary compensation. Several FGD participants 
stated that they would like to be trained in better poultry management practices so as to minimize their 
losses to future disease outbreaks and also to improve the general health and productivity of their flocks.  
Some FGD participants also stated that instead of cash payment they would prefer to have access 
to credit at a low interest rate so that once their flocks were disposed of they would have the option to 
diversify into alternative livelihood activities, including non-farm businesses such as small-scale 
manufacturing using local farm produce and petty trading of manufactured items. There is an existing 
small and medium enterprise (SME) program in Nigeria, the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme, 
under which the federal government has empowered the Nigerian Agricultural, Co-operative and Rural 
Development Bank Ltd. (NACRDB) to offer loans to small-scale farmers. As a result, the participants 
were familiar with NACRDB, though few said they had access to credit, which requires sufficient 
collateral.  
Based on these FGDs, five attributes were selected to be used in the definition of the broader 
compensation plan:  
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Compensation Payment Rate. This is the compensation payment per local rooster (male chicken). This 
bird was chosen because many farm households in the selected villages are expected to have one (as 
opposed to commercial chickens or other species such as turkey, duck, or goose) and it is considered to be 
more valuable than a female chicken. Consequently, it was thought that with the local rooster as the 
“flagship” bird the respondents would take the choice experiment exercise, which is hypothetical in 
nature, more seriously. The levels for compensation payment per local rooster were determined through 
the market prices reported in the FGDs as well as the compensation rates reported in the federal 
government’s manual on compensation (FMARD 2006). This attribute had five levels: Nigerian naira 
(NGN) 750, NGN 600, NGN 400, NGN 340, and the status-quo level of NGN 250. 
Days it Takes to Receive the Payment. This attribute refers to the number of days it takes to receive the 
compensation payment after birds are culled. Based on the FGDs regarding what could constitute an 
appropriate time frame within which to receive the payment, this attribute was defined in five levels: 14, 
35, 56, and 105 days, in addition to the status-quo level of 140 days (five months) reported in the FGDs in 
Hayin Gada.  
Method of Payment. Based on the mode of compensation payment discussed in the FGDs, there were two 
possible alternative levels to this attribute: The compensation money could be paid either in private, at the 
home of the recipient, or in public, in the presence of the entire village and relevant government 
representatives, which was the status-quo level.  
Biosecurity Training. This attribute refers to training on better poultry management practices (such as 
medication, housing, and disinfection) to improve biosecurity levels and thereby minimize future losses to 
avian flu or other poultry disease outbreaks as well as to improve the health and productivity of flocks. 
This attribute had two levels: training offered versus not offered, where the latter was the status-quo level.  
Facilitated Bank Loan. This attribute refers to farm households whose flocks are culled having access to 
facilitated collateral-free bank loans of up to NGN 20,000 at a two percent annual interest rate for five 
years. This loan would be provided by NACRDB. The information used to define the loan offer was 
obtained from Central Bank of Nigeria (2005), Olaitan (2006), Oladeebo and Oladeebo (2008), and 
consultations with NACRDB officials at the Akwanga and Lafia branches. This attribute had two levels: 
facilitated bank loan offered versus not offered, where the latter was the status-quo level.  
The attributes and the levels used in this choice experiment are summarized in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2—Compensation plan attributes and attribute levels used in the choice experiment 
Attribute  Definition  Levels 
Compensation 
payment rate  
Monetary compensation paid per rooster culled is …  NGN 750, NGN 600, NGN 
400, NGN 340 or NGN  250*
,a 
Days it takes to 
receive payment  
Number of days it takes to receive the compensation 
payment is … 
14, 35, 56, 105 or 140 days 
Method of payment   Compensation payment given to the affected 
household is made … 
In private vs. in public 
Biosecurity training  Free training on how to improve biosecurity in small-
scale household-level poultry production is … 
Offered vs. not offered 
Facilitated bank loan   Collateral-free loan of NGN 20,000 at 2% interest rate 
for 5 years is … 
Offered vs. not offered 
Source:  Nasarawa Avian Flu Compensation Choice Experiment Survey, 2009. 
Notes:  *Levels in italics indicate the status-quo levels of each attribute; 
aNGN, Nigerian naira.  
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Experimental design techniques (Louviere et al. 2000) were used to obtain an orthogonal design, 
which consisted of only the main effects and resulted in 32 pairwise comparisons of compensation plan 
alternatives. These were randomly blocked to four different versions, each with eight choice sets. Each set 
contained two new compensation plan alternatives (A or B) and a status-quo or baseline alternative, 
whose inclusion in the choice set is instrumental to achieving welfare measures that are consistent with 
demand theory (Bateman et al. 2003). The attributes chosen for the status-quo alternative were those of 
the 2006 compensation plan, since according to the FGD findings presented above, this was the only plan 
the farm households were aware of. Figure 3.1 provides an example of a choice set presented to the 
respondents. 
Figure 3.1—Example of a choice set 
Assuming there is a bird flu outbreak in your village and the government culls your birds, which of the 











payment per rooster 
NGN 750 
 
NGN 400  NGN 250 
Days it takes to receive 
payment 
14 days  35 days  140 days  
 
Method of payment  Public  Private  Public 
Biosecurity training  No  Yes  No 
Facilitated bank loan  Yes  No  No 
Source: Nasarawa Avian Flu Compensation Choice Experiment Survey, 2009. 
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4.   RESULTS 
Data Coding 
The data were coded according to the levels of the attributes. Attributes with two levels (method of 
payment, biosecurity training, and facilitated back loan) entered the utility function as effects-coded 
binary variables (method of payment coded as 1 for “private,” -1 for “public”; training and loan coded as 
1 for “offered,” -1 for “not offered”) (see Table 3.2) (Louviere et al. 2000). Data for the attributes with 
four levels were entered in cardinal-linear form. The attributes for the status-quo option (the status-quo 
compensation plan) were coded with the values that focus group participants reported for the 2006 
compensation plan.  
Conditional Logit Model 
The choice experiment was designed with the assumption that the observable utility function would 
follow a strictly additive form. The model was specified so that the probability of choosing a particular 
compensation plan was a function of the five attributes. Using the 832 choices elicited from the 104 
respondents, we estimated the conditional logit model (CLM), the results of which are reported in Table 
4.1. 
Table 4.1—Conditional logit model for compensation plan attributes 
Attribute   Coeff. (Std. Err.) 
Compensation payment rate   0.00233***(0.0003) 
Days it takes to receive payment   -0.0091***(0.0013) 
Method of payment   0.2428***(0.4943) 
Biosecurity training  0.4576***(0.0538) 
Facilitated bank loan   0.4607*** (0.0545) 
2 ρ   0.00688 
Log-likelihood  -603.39 
Sample size  832 
Source:  Nasarawa Avian Flu Compensation Choice Experiment Survey, 2009. 
Note:  ***1% significance with two-tailed tests. 
The overall fit of the model, as measured by McFadden’s ρ
2,
 is low. The ρ
2 value in conditional 
logit models is similar to the R
2 in conventional analysis except that significance occurs at lower levels. 
According to Hensher, Rose, and Greene (2005), values of ρ
2 between 0.2 and 0.4 are considered to be 
extremely good fits. Even though the fit of the CLM is poor, all the coefficients are statistically 
significant and intuitively correct. All the attributes were significant factors in determining the farmers’ 
preference of a compensation plan, and ceteris paribus, farmers were more likely to choose plans that 
offered higher compensation rates, payments made in fewer days, payments made in private, biosecurity 
training, and facilitated bank loans.  
Among the attributes with two levels, the coefficient on the facilitated bank loan attribute is the 
highest, followed very closely by that of biosecurity training, whereas the method of payment attribute is 
only half as important in the choice of a compensation plan compared with the two former attributes. 
Finally, the sign of the compensation payment attribute is positive and significant, as expected according 
to the economic theory.  
To test whether the CLM is the appropriate model specification, a Hausman and McFadden 
(1984) test was carried out. The IIA property was significantly violated when any one of the three choice 
alternatives was dropped from the choice sets, indicating that the model does not fully conform to the  
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underlying IIA property. Therefore the model needs to be augmented either by employing the random 
parameter logit model (also referred to as mixed logit) or by including socioeconomic characteristics as 
interaction terms, or both (Revelt and Train 1998). 
Random Parameter Logit Model 
The random parameter logit model (RPLM) (Train 1998) was estimated. The results of the RPLM 
estimations are reported in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2—Random parameter logit model (RPLM) and RPLM with interactions 











Compensation payment rate   0.00373*** 
(0.0006) 
-  0.00342*** 
(0.0006) 
- 
































Education x loan   -  -  0.198* 
(0.152) 
- 
Education x training  -  -  0.0376** 
(0.189) 
- 
Number of birds culled x compensation   -  -  0.00004* 
(0.00002) 
- 
Number of birds culled x training  -  -  0.0067* 
(0.005) 
- 
Income from poultry x loan  -  -  0.0342* 
(0.024) 
- 
Total household income x training  -  -  -0.00002*** 
(0.000006) 
- 
Total household income x method of payment   -  -  0.000008** 
(0.000004) 
- 
2 ρ   0.365  0.383 
Log-likelihood  -580.03  -564.12 
Sample size  832  832 
Source: Nasarawa Avian Flu Compensation Choice Experiment Survey, 2009. 
Notes: ***1% significance, **5% significance, *10% significance level with two-tailed tests. 
Compared with the CLM, the RPLM has a higher level of parametric fit, exhibiting higher ρ
2 and 
log-likelihood. With its ρ
2 value of 0.365, the RPLM has an extremely good fit. The improvements in the 
model specification with the use of the RPLM can be tested for significance with a Swait-Louviere log-
likelihood ratio test. The calculated statistic is -2[-603.39-(-580.03)] = 46.72, which is larger than 14.86, 
the critical value of χ
2 distribution at 4 degrees of freedom (the difference between the number of 
parameters in the two models) at the 0.5 percent significance level. This result indicates that the 
improvement in model fit is significant. Therefore the RPLM is a better fit than CLM for the estimation 
of the data.  
The RPLM results revealed that the method of payment attribute supported a significant and large 
standard deviation. Almost half (49 percent) of the households preferred payment in public and the other 
half preferred payment in private. The high level of heterogeneity in households’ preference for this  
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attribute, as evident in the significant and large attribute standard deviation, resulted in the insignificance 
of the overall coefficient mean.  
The biosecurity training attribute also supported a significant and large standard deviation, with 
almost two-thirds (67 percent) of the households preferring that the compensation plan offers biosecurity 
training. The other three attributes had insignificant standard deviations, revealing that all households 
preferred higher compensation rates, wanted to receive their payment in fewer days, and wanted the 
compensation plan to offer a facilitated bank loan. 
Random Parameter Logit Model with Interactions 
In order to identify the possible sources of heterogeneity, interactions of household-specific 
socioeconomic and HPAI-related characteristics with choice-specific attributes were included in the 
utility function. We tested various interactions of the five compensation plan attributes with the 
household-level characteristics reported in Table 3.1. The model that included interactions of choice-
specific attributes with the years of education of the household head, number of poultry culled in 2006, 
income from poultry sales, and total household income was found to fit the data best. Variance 
inflationary factor calculations and the correlation matrix revealed the correlation and multicollinearity 
among these household-level variables to be insignificant. The utility function was extended to include 
these interactions, and the final model was estimated. The results are reported in the last two columns of 
Table 4.2.  
Compared with the basic RPLM, the RPLM with interactions has a higher level of parametric fit: 
ρ
2 increases and log-likelihood decreases. The Swait-Louviere log-likelihood ratio test is -2[-580.03-(-
564.12)] = 31.8, which is larger than 20.28, the critical value of χ
2 distribution at 7 degrees of freedom at 
the 0.5 percent significance level. Therefore the RPLM with interactions is a better fit for the data than the 
RPLM. Similar to the results of the RPLM, the results of RPLM with interactions revealed that the 
standard deviations for the method of payment and biosecurity training attributes were significant and 
large, indicating significant unobserved heterogeneity for these attributes, which could not be explained 
entirely by the inclusion of the interaction terms. 
The significant interactions revealed that households with more-educated heads preferred 
compensation plans that offered a facilitated loan and biosecurity training. Households that had a higher 
number of birds culled during the 2006 outbreaks preferred plans that would pay higher compensation 
rates and offer biosecurity training. Finally, households with higher total household incomes were less 
likely to choose plans that would provide biosecurity training and more likely to choose plans that would 
make the payment in private, in the recipient’s home. 
Estimation of Willingness to Pay 
The choice experiment method is consistent with utility maximization and demand theory (Bateman et al. 













where CS is the compensating surplus welfare measure, α is the marginal utility of income (represented 
by the coefficient of the monetary attribute in the choice experiment, which is compensation rate in this 
case) and Vi0 and Vi1 represent indirect utility functions before and after the change under consideration 
(that is, after the improvement in the status-quo compensation plan of 2006).  
For the linear utility index, the marginal value of a change in a single compensation plan attribute 
can be estimated as a ratio of coefficients. The ratio represents the marginal rate of substitution between 
the monetary attribute and the compensation plan attribute in question, or the marginal welfare measure 
(willingness to pay [WTP] or willingness to accept [WTA]) for a change in any one of the attributes. For  
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the binary compensation plan attributes, which are effects-coded, equation (5) reduces to a part-worth (or 





















The demand functions conditional on the respondent characteristics reported in Table 4.2 can be 
used to calculate the value assigned by the respondent to compensation plan attributes by modifying 
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where variables  4 1− S  are the four respondent-specific characteristics under consideration. Respondents’ 
valuation (WTP or WTA) for compensation plan attributes were calculated for the best-fitting RPLM with 
interactions for the average household and for eight selected household profiles. These eight household 
profiles were generated to describe the variation in WTP/WTA within the sample, based on the farm- and 
household-level characteristics that were found to affect the households’ preferences for different 
compensation plan attributes.  
The first two profiles were generated according to the household heads’ education level, the third 
and fourth based on the number of birds culled, the fifth and sixth according to the households’ income 
from poultry, and the last two based on total household income. For each set of households, the sample 
mean for the variable was chosen to profile those who had above-mean versus mean and below-mean 
values for each of the variables used for profiling.  
Table 4.3 reports the characteristics of the average household and the eight selected household 
profiles. Table 4.4 reports the marginal WTP/WTA results for these households and Table 4.5 presents 
the results of the Poe, Severance-Lossin, and Welsh (1994) simple convolutions process, which tests 
whether there are significant differences between the WTP/WTA values of the average household and 
those of the eight selected household profiles.  
WTP/WTA estimates derived from the best-fitting RPLM with interactions resulted in 
insignificant values for the method of payment attribute for each of the profiles. For the attribute of how 
long it takes to receive the payment, an average household was willing to accept NGN 3.8 (NGN 2.6 to 
NGN 5) more compensation per rooster for each day of delay in receiving the payment. This value is 
similar across the household profiles, with the exception of household profile 3 (households with above-
sample-average number of birds culled in 2006), who were willing to accept statistically significantly 
lower compensation for each extra day they had to wait for their monetary compensation. This may be 
explained by the fact that these households were already used to waiting for long periods and therefore 
their discount rates were lower compared to those who had not experienced long waits to receive a 
payment. 
For the training and loan attributes, farm households exhibited negative WTA values, implying 
that they would be willing to pay, or willing to forgo the monetary compensation, if they were to be able 
to have access to these benefits. The average household in our sample was willing to pay NGN 140 (NGN 
73 to NGN 207) or willing to forgo this level of compensation (per rooster) in order to receive training 
from the veterinary department on better poultry management practices and improvement of biosecurity 
levels so as to be able to minimize disease risk and improve productivity of poultry production. 
Compared to the average household profile, household profiles 1, 4, 6, and 8 were willing to pay 
significantly higher amounts for the training attribute, whereas profile 5 was willing to pay less for this 
attribute. This can be explained by the fact that households that derive a greater share of their income 
from poultry have larger flocks and rely on poultry for their income more than the average household;  
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therefore, they are already informed about biosecurity measures and efficient poultry management 
practices and they are more likely to lose a greater proportion of their income if their birds are culled.  
Table 4.3—Mean (std. dev.) of the average and eight selected household profiles 
Profile   HH head 
education in 
years 
No. of birds 
culled 
Share of poultry 













Profile 1: HH head education 









Profile 2: HH head education 









Profile 3: HH with no. of birds 









Profile 4: HH with no. birds 









Profile 5: HH poultry income 









Profile 6: HH poultry income 









Profile 7: HH income above 









Profile 8: HH income below 









Source: Nasarawa Avian Flu Compensation Choice Experiment Survey, 2009. 
Note: NGN, Nigerian naira. 
Table 4.4—Marginal WTP/WTA for compensation plan attributes (95% C.I.) in NGN/household 
for RPLM with interactions  
  Days it takes to 
receive payment 
Biosecurity training  Facilitated bank loan 
Average household   3.79 (2.62 to 4.96)  -140.1 (-207.05 to -73.15)  -113.15 (-167.75 to -58.55) 
Profile 1  3.78 (2.61 to 4.95)  -189.8(-264.4 to -115.2)  -133.6 (-192.45 to -74.75) 
Profile 2  3.79 (2.82 to 4.76)  NS  -87.95 (-144.55 to -31.35) 
Profile 3  2.8 (1.47 to 4.13)  NS  -87(-129 to -45) 
Profile 4  4.15 (3.05 to 5.25)  -168.9 (-245.05 to -92.75)  -123 (-184.15 to -61.85) 
Profile 5  3.4 (2.2 to 4.6)  -79.9 (-138.25 to -21.55)  -176.1(-255.6 to -96.6) 
Profile 6  3.86 (2.74 to 4.98)  -150.1(-219.2 to -81)  -105 (-160.4 to -49.6) 
Profile 7  3.64 (2.42 to 4.86)  NS  -113 (-165.9 to -60.1) 
Profile 8  3.91 (2.69 to 5.13)  -215.05 (-292.5 to -137.6)  -118.85(-175.8 to -61.9) 
Source: Nasarawa Avian Flu Compensation Choice Experiment Survey, 2009. 
Note: NGN, Nigerian naira; WTP, willingness to pay; WTA, willingness to accept; C.I., confidence interval; RPLM, random 
parameter logit model; NS, not significant. 
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Table 4.5—Proportion of WTP/WTA differences for compensation plan attributes falling below 
zero 
  
Days it takes to receive 
payment 
Biosecurity training  Facilitated bank loan 
Average vs. Profile 1  0.8109  0.9764**  0.7631 
Average vs. Profile 2  0.8107  NS  0.7635 
Average vs. Profile 3  0.9009*  NS  0.7726 
Average vs. Profile 4  0.7764  0.9492**  0.6754 
Average vs. Profile 5  0.8449  0.9994***  0.7322 
Average vs. Profile 6  0.8033  0.9937***  0.6844 
Average vs. Profile 7  0.8244  NS  0.0183 
Average vs. Profile 8  0.7988  0.9994***  0.8632 
Source: Nasarawa Avian Flu Compensation Choice Experiment Survey, 2009. 
Notes: ***1% significance, **5% significance, *10% significance level with two-tailed tests; WTP, willingness to pay; WTA, 
willingness to acceptl; NS, not significant. 
Households with more-educated heads (profile 1) and those who had lower income levels (profile 
6) valued training highly. This may be explained by the former’s ability to assess the marginal impact 
such an intervention could have on their poultry productivity and income, and the latter’s willingness to 
try better poultry management practices to improve their livelihood outcomes, such as income. 
Households who had fewer birds culled in 2006 (profile 4) and those who derived smaller proportions of 
their incomes from poultry (profile 6) also valued the training attribute highly, perhaps owing to the 
former’s willingness to minimize avian flu disease risk and the latter’s willingness to increase the share of 
income from poultry. For the facilitated loan attribute, an average household was willing to accept less 
compensation (or willing to pay) as much as NGN 113 (NGN 59 to NGN 168) per rooster. Across 
household profiles the marginal value of this attribute did not vary significantly. However, those who 
were more educated and had an above-average number of birds culled in 2006 valued this attribute more, 
revealing these households’ willingness to have access to loans for restocking their flocks, diversifying 
into other livelihood strategies, or both.  
The marginal WTP/WTA values reported in Table 4.4 do not provide estimates of compensating 
surplus (CS) for alternative compensation plans. In order to estimate the farmers' CS for different 
compensation plans, four improved plans were created, in addition to the status-quo (2006) plan: 
Status-quo compensation plan (0). In this plan, it takes 140 days to receive the payment, which is 
made publically; no facilitated loan or biosecurity training is offered. 
Improved compensation plan 1. In this plan, it takes 14 days to receive the payment, which is 
made publically. This is equivalent to the improved compensation plan of 2007. However, no facilitated 
loan or biosecurity training is offered. 
Improved compensation plan 2. In this plan, it takes 14 days to receive the payment, which is 
made publically; a facilitated loan is offered but biosecurity training is not offered. 
Improved compensation plan 3. In this plan, it takes 14 days to receive the payment, which is 
made publically; biosecurity training is offered but a facilitated loan is not offered. 
Improved compensation plan 4. In this plan, it takes 14 days to receive the payment, which is 
made privately; both a facilitated loan and biosecurity training are offered. 
The CS values for the five compensation plans are presented in Table 4.6 for each household 
profile; the mean CS values are depicted in Figure 4.1. For all household types, there was a steep decline 
in CS values when the status-quo plan (2006) was improved to plan 1 (the 2007 plan), revealing that 
lower compensation payment rates would be acceptable if the compensation payment were made sooner. 
The average household profile’s WTA compensation (as well as those of profiles 1, 4, and 6) decreased 
and became negative (that is, turned into WTP) with improvements in scenarios. Especially household  
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profiles 1 (households who had heads with above-mean education) and 8 (households with incomes 
below mean) highly valued the fourth plan, which offers both training and a loan.  
Table 4.6—Compensating surplus (95% C.I) for each scenario and household profile (in NGN per 
rooster per household) 













(366.8 to 694.4) 
53.06 
(36.68 to 69.44) 
-60.09 
(-131.07 to 10.89) 
-87.04 
(-170.37 to -3.71) 
-200.19 
(-338.12 to -62.26) 
Profile 1  529.2 
(365.4 to 693) 
52.92 
(36.54 to 69.3) 
-80.68 
(-155.91 to -5.45) 
-136.88 
(-227.86 to -45.9) 
-270.48 
(-420.31 to -120.65) 
Profile 2  530.6 
(394.8 to 666.4) 
53.06 
(39.48 to 66.64) 
-34.89 
(-105.07 to 35.29) 
53.06 
(39.48 to 66.64) 
-34.89 
(-105.07 to 35.29) 
Profile 3  392 
(205.8 to 578.2) 
39.2 
(20.58 to 57.82) 
-47.8 
(-108.42 to 12.82) 
39.2 
(20.58 to 57.82) 
-47.8 
(-108.42 to 12.82) 
Profile 4  581 
(427 to 735) 
58.1 
(42.7 to 73.5) 
-64.9 
(-141.45 to 11.65) 
-110.8 
(-202.35 to -19.25) 
-233.8 
(-386.5 to -81.1) 
Profile 5  476 
(308 to 644) 
47.6 
(30.8 to 64.4) 
-128.5 
(-224.8 to -32.2) 
-32.3 
(-107.45 to 42.85) 
-208.4 
(-363.05 to -53.75) 
Profile 6  540.4 
(383.6 to 697.2) 
54.04 
(38.36 to 69.72) 
-50.96 
(-122.04 to 20.12) 
-96.06 
(-180.84 to 11.28) 
-201.06 
(-341.24 to -60.88) 
           
Profile 7  509.6 
(338.8 to 680.4) 
50.96 
(33.88 to 68.04) 
-62.04 
(-132.02 to 7.94) 
50.96  
(33.88 to 68.04) 
-62.04 
(-132.02 to 7.94) 
Profile 8  547.4 
(376.6 to 718.2) 
54.74 
(37.66 to 71.82) 
-64.11 
(-121.06 to -7.16) 
-160.31 
(-237.76 to -82.86) 
-279.16 
(-413.56 to -144.76) 
Source: Nasarawa Avian Flu Compensation Choice Experiment Survey, 2009. 
Note: C.I., confidence interval; NGN, Nigerian naira. 
Figure 4.1—Compensating surplus for the status-quo compensation plan (0) and four improved 
scenarios  
 
Source: Nasarawa Avian Flu Compensation Choice Experiment Survey, 2009. 












































Average household Profile 1 Profile 2
Profile 3 Profile 4 Profile 5
Profile 6 Profile 7 Profile 8 
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5.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Among the limited livelihood diversification strategies that poor households in developing countries tend 
to have, livestock constitutes an important livelihood strategy. At the same time, a great majority of the 
livestock in developing countries is owned or managed by these resource-poor, small-scale, household-
level producers (Livestock in Development 1999). This paper is based on the premise that in order to be 
able to control livestock diseases in developing countries efficiently, effectively, and equitably, an 
integrated approach that combines building of livelihood resilience with the design of compensation 
policy is required.  
To this end, in this paper we present the results of a choice experiment study designed to shed 
light on poor farm households’ preferences for various compensation plan attributes and these 
households’ trade-offs among these attributes following a livestock disease outbreak. We collected data 
from 104 farm households located in the Nasarawa state of Nigeria and used avian flu as the livestock 
disease of focus. We defined compensation plan broadly, to include not just the traditional attributes 
(such as the number of days it takes to receive the payment, the compensation rate, and the method of 
payment) but also more diverse interventions, such as training for poultry farmers in biosecurity measures 
and facilitating access to bank loans. These latter attributes are hypothesized to have longer-term impacts 
on the farm households’ livelihood strategies and hence outcomes, by helping them diversify into 
livelihood activities other than poultry, improve the productivity of their poultry, or both. Therefore these 
interventions are expected to enhance households’ resilience against future shocks (be they poultry 
disease outbreaks or other idiosyncratic shocks), thus bridging livelihood resilience-building and the 
design of incentive-compatible disease control policies. 
The choice experiment data were analyzed by using various discrete choice models, the best-
fitting of which was the random parameter (or mixed) logit model with interactions. This model enabled 
the capturing of both unobserved and observed heterogeneity in farm households’ preferences for the 
compensation plan attributes. The results of our analysis revealed that overall, farm households chose 
compensation plans that would make the payment sooner, provide facilitated credit access, and offer 
biosecurity training. Households with better-educated heads and those with lower income levels had the 
highest utility or demand for compensation plans that would provide credit access and biosecurity 
training.  
Even though these findings are from a small pilot study, they may be indicative of the preferences 
of resource-poor Nigerian farm households who have been affected by avian flu outbreaks or threats. 
According to our findings, the provision of biosecurity training to household-level, small-scale poultry 
producers may be an appropriate policy that encourages private preventive investments that could result 
in socially optimal biosecurity levels. Further, the identification of different household profiles’ 
preferences could assist in the development of targeted interventions, which could not only reduce the 
avian flu disease risk but also improve the resilience of poor farm households’ livelihoods against future 
poultry-related or other idiosyncratic shocks. The findings presented here are therefore expected to 
inform the design of efficient, effective, equitable, and targeted compensation and livelihood 
diversification policies.   
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